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CASES NOTED 257
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- DUE PROCESS-
CURFEW ORDINANCES
Appellant was charged with aiding a minor to violate a curfew ordinance
which prohibited certain minors "from being in any public place"' after
10:00 p.m. unless such presence was warranted by a business purpose. Appel-
lant's writ of prohibition to prevent Prosecution, based on the contention
that the ordinance violated the California Constitution2 and the 14th amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States, was denied. On appeal, held,
reversed. The ordinance lacked any real or substantial relationship to its
primary purpose3 and was unconstitutional as an arbitrary invasion of the
inherent personal rights and liberties of all citizens. Alves v. Justice Court
of Chico Judicial District, 306 P.2d 601 (Dist. Ct. 3d Dist. Cal. 1957.)
In determining the validity of ordinances as an exercise of police power,
the courts have established certain guides. They must be definite and certain
in their precise meaning;4 must be neither arbitrary nor unreasonable;5 and
there must be a clear, real and substantial relationship to the purpose which
is to be accomplished. 0
In 1898 a curfew ordinance was reviewed by the courts for the first
time in Ex parte McCarver7 and was declared unconstitutional as an unreas-
onable invasion of personal liberty. The courts then remained silent on this
question for a decade.8 All subsequent decisions which could be found have
I. Cico MUNICIPAL CODE § 684a, which provided that minors under the age
of 17 years were prohibited from being in any public place between 10 p.m. and 5 a.m.
unless accompanied by parent or guardian, or unless the presence of the minor is con-
nected with or required by some legitimate business, trade, profession or occupation in
which the minor is engaged.
2. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1, "All men are by nature free and independent, and have
certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and
liberty; acquiring, possessing and protecting property; and pursuing and obtaining safety
and happiness."
3. With regard to the primary purpose of the ordinance, the court said . . . thepurpose and intent in the enactment was . . . a better control of juveniles during the
late hours of the night." Alves v. Justice Court of Chico Judicial District, 306 P. 2d 601,
605 (Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. Cal. 1957).
4. Lauzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 444 (1939); McCall v. Daniels, 156 Fla. 437,
23 So. 2d 492 (1945); People v. O'Corman, 274 N.Y. 284, 8 N. E. 2d 862 (1937).5. Miami Beach v. Texas Co., 141 Fla. 616, 194 So. 368 (1940); Waller v. Osban,
60 Fla. 268, 52 So. 970 (1910); Senefsky v. Lawler, 307 Mich. 728, 12 N. W. 2d 387(1943).
6. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Ex parte lall, 50 Cal. App. 786,
195 Pac. 975 (1920); cf. Soref, Doctrine of Reasonableness in the Police Power, 15
MAKQ. L. REv. 3 (1930).
7. 39 Tex. Crim. 448, 46 S. W. 936 (1898). The ordinance prohibited persons
under 21 years from being on the streets after 9 p.m. unless with a parent or guardian,
or in search of a physician.
8. While the issue of curfew ordinances did not arise, the courts decided many
cases on similar ordinances, involving similar principles. See Taylor v. City of Sandersville,
118 Ga. 63, 44 S. E. 845 (1903), (ordinance making it a crime to be found loitering
or loafing upon the streets held valid); Hyman v. Boldrick, 153 Ky. 77, 154 S. ,V. 369(1913), (ordinance making it unlawful for a pawnbroker, secondhand dealer or junk
merchant to keep his place of business open between 7 p.m. and 7 a.m. held valid);
Dunn v. Commonwealth, 105 Ky. 834, 49 S. W. 813 (1899), (ordinance prohibiting
prostitutes from being on the streets between 7 p.m. and 4 l.m. without reasonable
necessity held valid).
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held such ordinances constitutionalY A 1916 curfew was held to be a reas-
onable exercise of the cities' police power.10 Twenty-six years later a curfew
ordinance was upheld as a wartime measure" Two recent decisions further
strengthened the validity of such ordinances. One was upheld on the grounds
that it bore a reasonable relationship to the evil sought to be controlled; 2
the other on the grounds that it was not lacking in definiteness. 3
The District Court of Appeals held the instant curfew ordinance unreas-
onable as it lacked a definite relationship to the object sought to be attained.
The court favorably cited the McCarver case, 14 which held a curfew ordi-
nance prohibiting persons under 21 years from being on the streets after
9 p.m. unless in the company of a parent or guardian unconstitutional. It
distinguished the case of People v. Walton", as a far different situation. The
restrictions in that case were against minors who renained or loitered upon
public streets, and this court felt these restrictions were not as broad as those
in the present case, which restricted minors from being on the streets. The
court relied instead on Ex parte Hall,16 which concerned not a curfew
ordinance but an ordinance prohibiting dancing or dance music in a room
or hall within 25 feet of a residence after 10 p.m. That case discussed the
well established rules requiring reasonableness and a substantial relationship
between the ordinance and the ends sought to be accomplished, and this
court applied those rules to the present case.
Futhennore, each phrase of the ordinance was given its strictest literal
interpretation by the court. Such an interpretation violated a settled prin-
ciple of constitutional law, that all doubts as to constitutionality must be
resolved in favor of constitutionality.'7 The court also failed to give proper
9. Guidoni v. Wheeler, 230 Fed. 92 (9th Cir. 1916); United States v. Gordon
Kiyoshi Hirabayashi, 46 F. Supp. 657 (W. D. Vash. 1942); People v. Walton, 70 Cal,
App. 2d 862, 161 P. 2d 498 (1945); Portland v. Goodwin, 187 Ore. 409, 210 P. 2d 577
(1949).
10. Guidoni v. Wheeler, 230 Fed. 92 (9th Cir. 1916).
11. United States v. Gordon Kiyoshi Hirabayashi, 46 F. Supp. 657 (W. 0. Wash.
1942).
12. People v. Walton, 70 Cal. App. 2d 862, 161 P. 2d 498 (1945). Ordinance
made it a crime for any parent or guardian of any minor under 18 years of age to allow
or permit such minor to remain upon or loiter on any street or public place between the
hours of 9 p.m. and 4 a.m, unless accompanied by an adult having the care and custody
of such minor, unless the minor had in his possession a permit issued by the sheriff
showing a necessity for such minor to use the street or public place.
13. Portland v. Goodwin, 187 Ore. 409, 210 P. 2d 577 (1949). Ordinance made
it unlawful for any person to roam or be upon a street between 1 a.m. and 5 a.m. without
having and disclosing a lawful purpose.
14. Ex Narte McCarver, 39 Tex. Crim. 448, 46 S. W. 936 (1898).
15. 70 Cal. App. 2d 862, 161 1P. 2d 498 (1945).
16. 50 Cal. App. 786, 195 Pac. 975 (1920).
17. Portor v. Investors Syndicate, 286 U.S. 461 (1932); Bratton v. Chandler, 260
U.S. 110 (1922); Ex parte Ashton, 231 Ala. 497, 165 So. 773 (1936); Watson v.
Murphey, 36 Ariz. 367, 285 Pac. 1034 (1930); Hunt v. Manning, 24 Cal. App. 44, 140
Pac. 39 (1914); Ex parte White, 131 Fla. 83, 178 So. 876 (1938); 16 C. J. S., CONST.
LAw § 98 (1956).
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weight to other decisions construing curfew ordinances favorably,' 8 and
to the significant lack of cases holding such ordinances void. 9 The interpre-
tation of the ordinance offered by the attorneys for the state would not only
have been reasonable, but would also have given full support to the legis-
lative intent, which was a better control of juveniles during the late hours
of the night 20 Such an interpretation would have been similar to that
which upheld the ordinance in the Walton case.21
In view of the success that a recent curfew ordinance has had in reducing
the ever increasing rate of juvenile delinquency,22 the importance of the
instant case is clear. This case, decided with disregard for the weight of
authority and public necessity, casts a cloud of doubt over the potential
validity of existing and future curfew ordinances? 3
MURRAY GOLDMAN
18. See notes 10, 11, 12 and 13 supra.
19. Extensive research by the author failed to disclose any case, other than Ex parte
McCarver, note 8 supra, in which a curfew ordinance was held unconstitutional.
20. See attorneys' brief for the state cited in Alves v. Justice Court of Chico Judicial
District, 306 P. 2d 601, 603 (Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. Cal. 1957).
21. People v. Walton, 70 Cal. App. 2d 863, 161 P. 2d 498 (1945). The intent
of the legislature here was to regulate and protect children of immature years.
22. Wallace, Crime in the United States, LIFE, Sept. 9, 1957, p. 46, citing the
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, (1956), reports that
the number of arrests of persons under 18 years of age has jumped 16 percent in the
past three years. In contrast, during the first three years that the Philadelphia curfew
ordinance, approved January 26, 1955, was in effect, juvenile crime dropped 25 percent
in that city.
23. Curfew Ordinance of East Hartford, Connecticut, enacted January 1954; East
Moline, Illinois, Curfew Ordinance November 1948, amended June 1954; City of Juneau,
Alaska, Ordinance No. 27 § 2, held valid in Guidoni v. Wheeler, 230 Fed. 92 (9th Cir.
1916); Los Angeles City Ordinance No. 3611 § 2, amended by Ordinances Nos. 4256
and 4464, held constitutional in People v. Walton, 70 Cal. App. 2d 862, 161 P. 2d 498(1945); City of Portland, Oregon, Ordinance No. 76339 § 16-617, held constitutional
in Portland v. Goodwin, 187 Ore. 409, 210 P. 2d 577 (1949); a survey conducted by
Am. Mun. Ass'n., reported in 71 Am. City 108 (May 1956) states that of 260 Florida
municipalities questioned, 57 have curfew ordinances in effect. None tested by Fla.
Sup. Ct.
